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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach
that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among fi-
nancial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and
volatile). For four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks,
hedge funds, and insurance companies), we show that while small during normal times,
equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods.
Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the trans-
mission of shocks to other financial institutions.
I. Introduction
Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best
course for addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.
Ben S. Bernanke (2006)
One of the important lessons from the 2007–2009 financial crisis is that sys-
temic risk and spillover effects are significantly underestimated in most widely
used risk measures and that standard risk measurement instruments, such as the
value-at-risk (VaR) measure, need to be adjusted to adequately reflect overall risk.
In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity VaR (SDSVaR) approach
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for quantifying risk spillovers among sets of different financial institutions.1 We
estimate a system of quantile regressions for four sets of financial institutions
(commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies), in
which each type of financial institution is represented by an index of several firms.
In addition, our empirical model explicitly accounts for the effects of different
market states (tranquil, normal, and volatile) on the magnitude of risk spillovers.
We trace the time path of how shocks move through the system using impulse
response functions (IRFs). The SDSVaR model explicitly reveals the magnitude
of risk spillovers at time t. Moreover, in contrast to dynamic correlations, we are
able to obtain the direction of spillovers from one set of institutions to another.
Hence, the approach permits a delineation of spillover effects from shocks affect-
ing the financial sector as a whole.
We show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to
considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. For instance, during nor-
mal market times, a 1-percentage-point increase in the VaR of hedge funds is
estimated to increase the VaR of investment banks by 0.09 percentage points.
The same shock, however, increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by
0.71 percentage points during times of financial distress. Similarly, during normal
times a 1% increase in the VaR of commercial banks leads to a 0.01-percentage-
point increase in the VaR of investment banks. In times of financial distress the
spillovers from commercial banks to investment banks increases to 0.05 percent-
age points.
Overall, we make four main contributions to the literature. First, our two-
stage quantile regression approach permits an identification of spillover effects
as opposed to common shocks affecting the entire financial system. Second, we
use the identification of directional shocks to document differences in their mag-
nitude moving from tranquil to crisis times. Third, the results suggest that hedge
funds may play an even more prominent role as amplifiers of systemic risk than
previously thought. And fourth, the econometric approach allows us to quantify
intramonth spillover effects between different sets of financial institutions.
The paper is related to Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2011) conditional value-
at-risk (CoVaR) approach. However, we focus on spillover effects among finan-
cial institutions, rather than the contributions of financial institutions to systemic
risk. We furthermore apply a more flexible methodology that allows for the fact
that spillovers are determined simultaneously and that explicitly measures the
spillover effects during a crisis. The quantile regression setup and the dynamic
structure of the model are inspired by Engle and Manganelli’s (2004) conditional
autoregressive value-at-risk (CAViaR) model.
The SDSVaR model proposed in this paper is an indirect approach to mea-
suring spillover risk. Relevant determinants, such as direct linkages between in-
stitutions, leverage, liquidity, and hedge funds’ asset holdings, are not available
on a daily basis, so that we cannot explain the underlying economic relation-
ships of risk spillovers. Our empirical approach comes with some limitations.
Certain types of exposure between financial institutions will not be detected.
1We define a risk spillover as a shock in the VaR of one financial institution that is transmitted to
the VaR of another financial institution.
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First, our approach requires the presence of a shock in the VaR of one institution.
For instance, when prime brokers tightened margin requirements for hedge funds
in 2008, they most likely had an impact on the risk of hedge funds. Thus, hedge
funds were exposed to investment banks, but the lack of a shock in the VaR of
investment banks prevents us from measuring this type of exposure. Second, our
analysis is based on daily data, which allows us to measure the immediate re-
sponses (those that occur within the same day or the next day) but leaves spillovers
with a longer propagation lag undetected.2 This means that our spillover estimates
presented in the empirical part do not necessarily reflect the historically observed
order with which financial institutions affected each other. Finally, certain types
of exposure require investors to be informed about their presence. For instance,
the exposure of many banks to American International Group (AIG) via credit
default swap (CDS) contracts was basically unknown to investors and was only
revealed after AIG’s bailout in Sept. 2008, when a list of banks that benefited
most from the rescue package was published.
On the other hand, the main spillover mechanism that has been proposed
in the recent literature on systemic risk, the one we have in mind in this paper,
does not require any knowledge on the side of market participants. The loss and
margin spirals described in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2012) generate spillovers and externalities purely through the ac-
tions and loss reactions of financial institutions. For instance, a hedge fund facing
margin calls is forced to sell assets in order to raise the required cash, but the ad-
ditional supply that the fund injects in the market depresses prices further, which
may lead to margin calls for other financial institutions. The empirical approach
used in this paper is ideally suited in such an environment. It measures the size,
direction, and persistency of responses given a shock in one financial institu-
tion. Measuring spillovers through daily VaR has a number of other advantages.
In particular, it may capture risks that arise from relationships among financial in-
stitutions that may go beyond those reflected in simple accounting variables. For
instance, an article in The Economist (Aug. 9, 2007) describes the complex rela-
tionship between the three major prime brokers (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
and, at that time, Bear Stearns) and hedge funds. Investment banks that own cor-
porate bonds may use the swap market to hedge against corporate defaults. But
if hedge funds take the other side of the swap and at the same time depend on
loans from the same bank, the spillover risk between the bank and the hedge fund
increases. These types of spillover effects, to the extent that they are known to the
market, would be fully reflected in our estimates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section places
the paper into the literature. Section III explains our SDSVaR approach of model-
ing spillover effects. Section IV presents the data and the main empirical results.3
Section V gives some concluding remarks.
2In a previous version of this paper, we also try measuring spillovers with monthly data. The
results, however, are inconclusive. It seems that the additional observations from the daily frequency
are needed to estimate spillovers in the tails of the distribution.
3Since transparency and representativeness are major concerns when working with financial data
in general and hedge funds in particular, we provide a detailed Internet Appendix, available at
www.jfqa.org, on data source, index constituents, and representativeness.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109014000325
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:49:18, subject to the Cambridge Core
578 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
II. Previous Literature
As opaque and highly leveraged investment partnerships, hedge funds have
received prominent attention as a potential source of contagion, a transmission
channel of risk between different financial institutions, and potential amplifiers
of systemic risk in financial markets. If highly leveraged hedge funds are forced
to liquidate large position at fire-sale prices, counterparties sustain heavy losses.
This may lead to further defaults or threaten systemically important institutions
not only directly as counterparties or creditors but also indirectly through asset
price adjustments (Bernanke (2006)). It is unlikely, however, that the systemic rel-
evance of hedge funds is due to high leverage alone. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) highlight the importance of market liquidity and funding liquidity. In
particular, hedge funds provide liquidity to otherwise illiquid markets as long
as access to credit is easy. However, traders are concerned about margin calls
and avoid high margin positions when funding liquidity dries up. At that point,
prices are driven more by funding liquidity considerations than by movements in
fundamentals. The high exposure of hedge funds to changes in liquidity causes
endogenous risk, triggered by selling pressure, to set off further downward pres-
sure on asset prices within the financial system. This feedback loop is amplified
by the risk management tools themselves, which send selling signals on the same
assets in many institutions simultaneously (Danielsson and Shin (2003)).
While the literature generally tends to agree that hedge funds are systemi-
cally important and that this importance is likely to increase in the future
(Danielsson, Taylor, and Zigrand (2005), Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005),
Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007), and Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo
(2006), among others), our study is the first that provides empirical estimates of
the size of intramonth spillover effects from hedge funds to other financial institu-
tions. In this sense, we complement a recent paper by Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and
Pelizzon (2012), who investigate the interconnectedness among financial institu-
tions using monthly data. While they also find that insurance companies, banks,
brokers, and hedge funds have become highly interrelated over the past decade,
they focus on longer-term relationships, and they do not attempt to trace the trans-
mission of shocks through the system of financial institutions. Using daily data,
we show that the majority of the spillover effects are effective within 1 month,
reaching their peak after 10 to 15 days. These intramonth effects remain unob-
servable to empirical studies based on monthly data frequency.
Methodologically, the paper is related to Cappiello, Ge´rard, and Manganelli
(2005) and Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010), who apply quantile regression for
binary dependent variable models in order to measure contagion effects among
hedge fund styles.4 Similarly, Chan et al. (2006) and, more recently, Billio,
Getmansky, and Pelizzon (2009) propose a regime-switching framework to es-
timate the probabilities of switching to a “systemic risk regime.” The joint dis-
tribution of hedge fund returns is studied by Brown and Spitzer (2006), who
measure the dependence structure between hedge fund strategies using copulae.
4Another interesting study that seems to be relevant in our context is the recent working paper by
White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010), who propose a computationally intensive generalization of Engle
and Manganelli’s (2004) CAViaR model.
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While the first two studies estimate the effects on state probabilities rather than the
size of spillover effects, the latter study provides estimates on the tail-dependence
structure without presenting empirical estimates of the magnitude of potential risk
spillovers.5
The paper also complements a growing literature that examines the actual
channels of transmission between financial institutions in general and from hedge
funds to the financial system in particular, an issue that we leave unexplored in this
paper. However, the majority of that literature examines contagion and systemic
risk within the banking sector only. The main findings on systemic risk-generating
factors are thereby the growth in credit risk transfers (Hakenes and Schnabel
(2010), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marquez-Ibanez (2010)), investor sentiments
(Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Hott (2009)), and the interaction of liquidity short-
ages and solvency problems among banks (Diamond and Rajan (2005)).6 Gropp,
Lo Duca, and Vesala (2009) and Gropp and Moerman (2004), as well as Hart-
mann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2007), show that distress in one banking system
transmits across national borders to other banking systems. Brownlees and Engle
(2011) and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (APPR) (2010) pro-
pose marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic expected shortfall (SES)
as measures of systemic risk and indicators of financial crises. Implications of
financial fragility for the real economy are analyzed by Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010), who find evidence that constrained firms bypass attractive invest-
ment opportunities and are forced to sell more assets to fund their operations. Fur-
thermore, sectors that are highly dependent on external financing also suffer the
greatest adverse impact on value added during banking crises (Kroszner, Laeven,
and Klingebiel (2007)).7
A few recent studies also provide evidence of contagion in the insurance in-
dustry. Allen and Gale (2007) argue that the considerable growth in the transfer
of credit risk across sectors of the financial system has led to a shift in risk from
the banking sector to the insurance sector. Fenn and Cole (1994) investigate the
contagion effects among life insurance companies when major insurance compa-
nies report significant write-downs of their portfolios. Negative wealth effects on
shareholders of other insurance companies are shown to be particularly strong if
the write-downs refer to junk bonds or commercial mortgages.
Finally, our approach is complementary to studies that are confined to esti-
mating the average impact on the response variable (e.g., Halstead, Hegde, and
Klein (2005), who use an event study approach to estimate contagion effects from
hedge funds during the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998,
or Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009), who investigate fund flows dur-
ing periods of financial distress).8
5In fact, the general belief in 2005 was that “current state-of-the-art methods do not allow us to
capture the systemic risk component of a hedge fund’s position” (see Danielsson et al. (2005)).
6One interesting aspect of the study by Hott (2009) is that uninformed “mood investors” may
create a price bubble even in the absence of speculation.
7Another implication of these findings is that full diversification may in fact not be desirable.
Although it reduces each institution’s individual probability of failure, it also increases the probability
of systemic risk (see Wagner (2010)).
8In these studies, the response variable is abnormal stock market returns and hedge fund flows,
respectively. The response variable in our study is the VaR of different financial institutions and the
hedge fund industry.
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III. A State-Dependent Sensitivity VaR Model
Our approach requires estimating VaR measures for four financial institu-
tions, which in turn are used as inputs in a quantile regression. This might seem
unnecessarily technical, given the standard practice of measuring comovements
among firms and assets with return correlations. However, return correlations are
insufficient for our purpose. In order to obtain meaningful spillover estimates,
one must be able to identify the direction of spillovers from one set of institu-
tions to another and delineate them from shocks affecting all financial institutions
simultaneously. Correlation coefficients, which by definition are symmetric, do
not permit such identification. As a benchmark, consider Table 1, which shows
the correlations of daily returns and squared daily returns (in square brackets)
among the four sets of financial institutions considered in this paper for the pre-
crisis period from April 2003 to June 2007 and the crisis period from July 2007
to July 2009.
As expected, correlation coefficients increase from the precrisis to the cri-
sis period, at least among commercial banks, insurance companies, and invest-
ment banks. However, the increase tends to be relatively small, at least compared
to some of the results we obtain below. Furthermore, the return correlations be-
tween hedge funds and the other three sets of institutions tend to decline in the
crisis, which may lead one to conclude that hedge funds were innocuous in trans-
mitting shocks in the crisis. This finding is robust to using weekly and monthly
frequencies (not reported) and also holds for correlations of squared returns
(i.e., nonlinear dependency (in square brackets)). Taking feedback effects into
account and identifying the direction of spillover effects will let us reach very
different conclusions below. Our model yields spillover effects that increase by a
factor of about 7 from tranquil to volatile times and suggests a central role in the
transmission of shocks of hedge funds in volatile periods.
The VaR is a risk measure with the appealing property of expressing the
risk in only one number. Its intuitive interpretation and regulatory importance
have led to general acceptance and wide application for internal and external
purposes. From a statistical standpoint, estimation of the VaR requires adequate
TABLE 1
Return and Squared Return Correlations among Financial Institutions
Table 1 presents daily return correlations for the precrisis and the crisis period. The data series are discussed in detail in
Section IV.A. Values in brackets denote correlations of squared returns.
Insurance Commercial Investment Hedge
Companies Banks Banks Funds
Panel A. Precrisis Period (Apr. 1, 2003–June 29, 2007)
Insurance companies 1
Commercial banks 0.75 [0.53] 1
Investment banks 0.65 [0.41] 0.71 [0.60] 1
Hedge funds 0.43 [0.18] 0.40 [0.26] 0.59 [0.43] 1
Panel B. Crisis Period (July 1, 2007–July 31, 2009)
Insurance companies 1
Commercial banks 0.83 [0.68] 1
Investment banks 0.78 [0.72] 0.75 [0.56] 1
Hedge funds 0.28 [0.35] 0.12 [0.16] 0.38 [0.42] 1
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modeling of the time-varying distribution of returns.9 In the past, a vast vari-
ety of different approaches have been applied, including generalized autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (Bollerslev (1986)), extreme value
theory (Danielson and De Vries (2000)), conditional autoregressive VaR (Engle
and Manganelli (2004)), and simulation-based methods (Barone-Adesi and
Giannopoulos (2001)). The 2007–2009 financial crisis, however, has further high-
lighted the importance of accounting for the dependence of a VaR measure of one
financial institution i on the VaR of some other institution j and, perhaps, on the
VaR of the entire financial system.10
To derive the SDSVaR approach, we start with the standard VaR of a single
type of financial institution. The VaR is the estimated loss of a financial institution
that, within a given period (usually 1 to 10 days), will be exceeded with a certain
probability θ (usually 1% or 5%). Thus, the 1-day 5% VaR shows the negative
return that will not be exceeded within this day with a 95% probability,
prob [returnt < −Vart |Ωt ] = θ.(1)
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose CoVaR as a measure for the contri-
bution of a financial institution to systemic risk. This conditional VaR measure
incorporates the additional risk in financial institution i caused by institution j be-
ing in distress. If the focus is on macroprudential bank regulation, institution i is
taken to be the financial system. A substantial difference between institution j’s
CoVaR and its VaR measure then indicates significant contribution of this insti-
tution to general systemic risk. Consequently, this should result in higher capital
surcharges for systemic risk-enhancing institutions.
CoVaR uses the same conceptual approach as VaR (i.e., prob[returnt <
−CoVaRt |Ωt ] = θ). However, the information set Ωt not only includes the own
past return history (i.e., Ωt(VaR) = {ri,t−1, ri,t−2, . . . , ri0}), but also the VaR of
another institution j:
Ωt (CoVaR) = {ri,t−1, ri,t−2, . . . , ri0,VaRj,t} .(2)
Using quantile regression, the CoVaR is estimated by regressing the θ%-quantile
of the return distribution of institution i on a constant and the returns of
institution j, Rj. The CoVaR between institutions i and j is then given by the fitted
values from this regression:
CoVaRi, j = ˆRi,θ |VaRj = αˆ + ˆβVaRj,(3)
where Ri is the time series of institution i returns. In order to model the condition
that institution j is in distress, the returns from institution j, Rj, are replaced by the
fitted values of institution j’s value-at-risk, VaRj.
9In the multivariate VaR context, additional attention has to be devoted to the tail dependencies of
the joint density of returns.
10We will refer at several points in this paper to the term “financial institution,” but this generally
corresponds to an index of single companies, representing each type of institution (commercial banks,
investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies).
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Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) extend equation (3) by adding a set of
lagged regressors Mt−1 that capture liquidity risk, market risk, and credit risk,
thus generating a flexible risk measure that reacts sensitively to the underlying
return process.11 In equation (3), the spillover coefficient ˆβ is an average over
all states of the economy. In this paper, we examine whether β, which measures
the spillover intensity of VaRj on VaRi, depends on the state of the economy.
We hypothesize that during normal market times, β may be of little economic
significance, while the spillover effect becomes very important during times of
financial distress.
We propose a two-step approach to estimate the spillover coefficients β.
In contrast to the CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), which re-
lies on quantile regression to model the distribution of returns (see Koenker and
Bassett (1978), Koenker (2005)), the SDSVaR proposed in this paper models
the distribution of the VaR. This has important consequences for the interpre-
tation of our results. In the CoVaR model, the quantile θ is set to low values
such as 1% or 5%. The result is a VaR estimate from the quantiles of the return
distribution. The way the VaR of one institution affects the VaR of another, that is,
the spillover coefficients, are assumed to be the same whether markets go through
a tranquil period or are hit by a recession. In our approach we obtain the VaR in
a preceding step, which allows us to regress the VaRs over the whole range of
quantiles.12 The important point is that movements in the VaR change with the
financial health of an institution. During tranquil market times, when institutions
have plenty of cushions to absorb shocks, risk spillovers between financial in-
stitutions are likely to be marginal. During this market phase, the VaR is close
to 0 (i.e., at high quantiles of the VaR distribution) and shows little variation. For
stock prices of financial institutions, this was generally the case during the time
period of 2003–2005. When the financial crisis hit in 2007, the behavior of the
VaR changed dramatically. The higher risk faced in the market not only sent the
VaR strongly negative (i.e., to low quantiles of the VaR distribution), but also
caused the VaR to be more volatile. During this period, dormant linkages that
were building up during tranquil periods became suddenly visible and led to high
spillovers between institutions. By modeling different quantiles of the VaR dis-
tribution, we can measure how the response of institutions to shocks in another
institution changes with the state of the market. Thus, while the 5%-quantile of
the return distribution is the VaR, low quantiles of the VaR distribution constitute
the VaR during times of financial distress. The former step is necessary to obtain
the desired risk measure, but it is the latter that introduces state dependency into
the model.
The first step in our model setup is to estimate the VaRs of all systemi-
cally relevant financial institutions, each covered by an index of several firms,
separately:
11The estimating equation in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) is Rsystemt =αsystem, j + βsystem, jR jt +
γsystem, jMt−1, where the regressor set Mt−1 consists of weekly financial market variables such as
liquidity spread and stock market volatility, and Rsystemt is measured with the returns of the entire
financial system.
12We estimate system (5) for three different quantiles with θ = {0.125, 0.5, 0.75}, where low,
medium, and high VaR quantiles describe volatile, normal, and tranquil states of financial markets,
respectively.
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̂VaRm = μˆm,t + zσˆm,t,(4)
with μˆm,t as the mean of institution m at time t.13 In the following we consider four
financial institutions, so that m= i, j, k, and l. It has become practice to model σˆm,t
by extracting the conditional standard deviation from a GARCH model (Kuester,
Mittnik, and Paolella (2006)). This accounts for the time-varying volatility of
returns and leads to substantial improvements in the sensitivity of the VaR to
changes in the return process. We therefore follow this practice.14
In a second step,̂VaRm becomes the dependent variable and is modeled by
its own lag and the VaR measures of the other three sets of institutions. In order
to interpret the spillover coefficients in a causal way, the equations also include
the following three control variables: the VaR of the general U.S. REIT index, the
VaR of the GSCI Commodity index, and the VaR of an index of U.S. nonfinancial
stocks. Although we are not interested in the coefficients of those variables, they
ensure that our spillover effects are not contaminated by exposure to a common
factor.
̂VaRi,t,θ = α1,θ + β1,θ̂VaRj,t + β2,θ̂VaRk,t + β3,θ̂VaRl,t(5a)
+ β4,θ̂VaRi,t−1 + γ′1,θVaRC,t + ui,t,
̂VaRj,t,θ = α2,θ + β5,θ̂VaRj,t−1 + β6,θ̂VaRk,t + β7,θ̂VaRl,t(5b)
+ β8,θ̂VaRi,t + γ′2,θVaRC,t + uj,t,
̂VaRk,t,θ = α3,θ + β9,θ̂VaRj,t + β10,θ̂VaRk,t−1 + β11,θ̂VaRl,t(5c)
+ β12,θ̂VaRi,t + γ′3,θVaRC,t + uk,t,
̂VaRl,t,θ = α4,θ + β13,θ̂VaRj,t + β14,θ̂VaRk,t + β15,θ̂VaRl,t−1(5d)
+ β16,θ̂VaRi,t + γ′4,θVaRC,t + ul,t.
We allow the vector of control variables VaRC,t to have feedback effects with
our financial institutions by modeling them in the same way, that is, the full sys-
tem has another three equations for the control variables, which are omitted from
13The mean μˆm,t can be estimated in a rolling window. In practice, however, the variation in μˆm,t
is dwarfed by the variation in volatility and does not contribute to the overall variation in VaR. For
simplicity, we therefore resort to a constant overall mean.
14For most of our return series, volatility responds more strongly to negative return changes than
to positive ones. To capture this fact we apply the asymmetric EGARCH(1,1) of Nelson (1991)
with a conditional t-distribution for the error terms. As a robustness check, we also change the
specification along several dimensions. We compared symmetric and asymmetric GARCH mod-
els, changed the assumptions of the error distribution, and increased the number of lags of the
EGARCH model. We also estimated our VaR series using the asymmetric slope version of Engle and
Manganelli’s (2004) CAViaR model. The main conclusions derived in this paper are unaltered by
these changes, and the spillover coefficients are similar in size. One exception was the EGARCH(2,2)
specification, which led to increased spillover estimated during normal and tranquil market times, but
the additional parameterization was not justified according to the Schwarz information criterion. Note
also that we use VaR instead of volatility, as the former has a more direct interpretation. Technically,
VaR is just a linear function of volatility, so that exactly the same spillover coefficients can be obtained
using volatilities. To conserve space, we do not show the results here, however, they are available from
the authors.
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the presentation of system (5) to improve readability. We estimate the parameters
in system (5) by two-stage quantile regression.15 Like in the standard two-stage
least squares (TSLS) approach, this method involves finding instruments for the
endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the equation using ordinary least
squares (OLS). The second stage, however, proceeds with estimating the parame-
ters with quantile regression instead of OLS. We identify the system by assuming
that the own lags,̂VaRm,t−1 in equations (5a)–(5d), only affect the VaR of institu-
tions m. Hence, our identifying assumption is that controlling for contemporane-
ous spillover effects from the other three sets of institutions, there is no additional
spillover effect of the lagged VaR of the other institutions. All four coefficients
for the own lagged VaRs, β4,θ, β5,θ, β10,θ, and β15,θ in equations (5a)–(5d), are
statistically significant at the 1% level and therefore constitute valid instruments
to identify the system.16 Equations (5a)–(5d) are the central equations in this
paper, and our interest lies in the estimates of the spillover coefficients
B′i,θ =
(
ˆβ1,θ, ˆβ2,θ, ˆβ3,θ
)
,B′j,θ =
(
ˆβ6,θ, ˆβ7,θ, ˆβ8,θ
)
,B′k,θ =
(
ˆβ9,θ, ˆβ11,θ, ˆβ12,θ
)
, and
B′l,θ =
(
ˆβ13,θ, ˆβ14,θ, ˆβ16,θ
)
, respectively.17
As we have motivated before, the quantiles θ of the VaR can be interpreted
as reflecting the state or condition of financial markets. Note that quantile regres-
sion models the conditional quantile of the left-hand side variable, and not of the
regressors. Accordingly, we estimate the spillovers conditioning on the financial
health of the institution receiving the spillovers. This follows our intuition that
financial institutions react more strongly to shocks when they are already weak-
ened. The collapse of a large bank may leave other banks in the system unharmed
during normal market times but can inflict substantial spillovers and distress dur-
ing times of financial crisis.18 When modeling spillover risk, it seems natural that
VaR measures are interdependent among financial institutions and that a set of
observed VaR measures at a given day are determined simultaneously. To address
the bias that is introduced by this simultaneous framework, we use the common
approach from TSLS to replace potentially endogenous right-hand side variables
by instruments obtained from lagged values. This additional effort is rewarded
with consistent estimates that account for the fact that the VaRs of interdependent
financial institutions are determined simultaneously.19
15See Powell (1983) for the derivation of the statistical properties of this estimator.
16Second-lag instruments,̂VaRi,t−2,̂VaRj,t−2,̂VaRk,t−2, and̂VaRl,t−2, are insignificant, and in-
cluding them has no effect on the results.
17As a byproduct, the fitted values from system (5) give an extension of the common VaR measure
that explicitly accounts for the spillovers from other institutions. In the following section, we briefly
present this extended VaR. However, our aim in this paper is not to improve the effectiveness of exist-
ing univariate VaRs in capturing daily volatility processes. Existing methods are sufficiently capable
of this task (see Kuester et al. (2006) for a comparison of univariate VaR measures).
18The VaR graphs for all four financial institutions (not shown) exhibit very similar patterns over
time, so that the shock-originating institution is generally in the same market state as the shock-
receiving institution. We also confirmed this finding in an expanded model that included binary vari-
ables indicating financial distress of the institutions on the right-hand side of the equation. To conserve
space, we do not show the results here, however, they are available from the authors.
19Note that in two-stage quantile regression, like in TSLS, each equation is estimated separately.
The state of the market is determined by the quantile of the left-hand side variable.
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IV. Measuring Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions
A. Data
The subprime and financial crisis of 2007–2009 spread from mortgage-
backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to commercial banks
and on to hedge funds and investment banks.20 Credit risk has furthermore shifted
from commercial banks to insurance companies (Allen and Gale (2007)).
According to Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008), U.S. dollars (USD)
1.1 trillion of potential losses (of approximately USD 1.4 trillion total reported
subprime exposure) were borne by commercial banks, investment banks, hedge
funds, and insurance companies. Consequently, we investigate the following four
financial institutions using daily data for the time period Apr. 2, 2003–Dec. 31,
2010 (2,023 observations).21 The findings in this paper do not change qualita-
tively if we use weekly instead of daily data. However, we cannot derive reliable
VaR measures from monthly data due to the absence of significant autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects when estimating conditional
volatility.
We generally use principal component analysis for the index weighting, but
the results are not affected by this specific weighting approach. We reestimated the
empirical results in this paper using equal weights for all four financial institutions
and find very similar results. The indices of our four financial institutions are
constructed as follows:
1. Commercial Bank Index (26 institutions). An index for the U.S. commercial
banking sector. Constituents are taken from APPR (2010). Note that the index
also contains a few large banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America. We are
aware of the fact that many large banks including Bank of America, Citigroup,
JP Morgan, and Deutsche Bank generate income from both commercial and
investment banking. Accordingly, the classification of these institutions con-
tains some degree of arbitrariness. However, the empirical results in this study
are generally unaffected by any overlaps between the two groups. The index
weights are estimated with principal component analysis.
2. Insurance Company Index (31 institutions). The constituents for this index are
also taken from APPR (2010), and index weights are estimated with principal
component analysis.
3. Investment Bank Index (8 institutions). The investment bank index was created
from the main eight publicly listed investment banks. We again used principal
component analysis for generating the index weights.
4. Hedge Fund Index (47 institutions). The Hedge Fund Research Equally
Weighted Strategies Index is comprised of all eligible hedge fund strategies.22
20See Brunnermeier (2009) for a comprehensive discussion of these linkages.
21A detailed description of all variables is given in the Internet Appendix, available at www
.jfqa.org.
22Another potential candidate for a composite index is the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index.
The empirical results using the Global Hedge Fund index are similar and yield the same qualitative
conclusions.
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The HFRX index family is an investable index based on information derived
from managed accounts for single hedge funds with the longest real track
record (i.e., the maximal numbers of observations). The composite as well
as the style indices cover the most liquid and largest single hedge funds in
terms of assets under management (AUM). Because the return data are not
self-reported, self-selection bias is not an issue. Furthermore, the index has not
been calculated back (backfilling bias) and does not suffer from survivorship
bias. The HFRX Equally Weighted Index contains 47 hedge funds and, al-
though similar, is not fully representative of the overall hedge fund universe.23
In short, we compare monthly return distributions and time-series properties
of the HFRX index and a truly representative index. The HFRX index closely
follows the development of an index derived from a hedge fund universe. Thus,
although the HFRX index may be contaminated with a measurement error, the
bias from using the HFRX is likely to be small.
B. Baseline Results
In this section, we present the results for estimating system (5). We are par-
ticularly interested in the spillover coefficient vector Bθ. The estimation uses the
sample period from Apr. 2, 2003 to Dec. 31, 2010 (2,023 observations) in order to
cover tranquil, normal, and volatile market periods. We choose the 75%-quantile
for tranquil market conditions, the 50%-quantile for normal market conditions,
and the 12.5%-quantile for conditions of financial distress.24
Figure 1 shows the slopes of the spillover coefficients for different quantiles.
While we discuss all spillover coefficients below, in Graph A of Figure 1 we
exemplarily present the effects from changes in the aggregate hedge fund VaR on
the VaR of investment banks in order to demonstrate the importance of permitting
different coefficients during different phases of the market.25
The solid black regression line shows the spillover coefficient of equation (3)
as implied by the CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Note how
the slope of this line shows some average spillover effect, but slopes are estimated
to be much flatter during tranquil market periods (lighter dashed lines) and much
steeper during volatile market phases (darker dashed lines). The CoVaR model
would estimate the slope of the spillover effects from the hedge funds’ VaR to
the VaR of investment banks to be about 0.09. This corresponds to the straight
23A detailed discussion of the differences and their implications for our empirical findings can be
found in the Internet Appendix, available at www.jfqa.org.
24The choice of specific quantiles introduces a certain degree of arbitrariness in our model. During
tranquil market times, risk spillovers are generally close to 0, so that the choice of a specific upper
quantile has no significant effect on the results. It is also plausible to choose the 50%-quantile for
normal market times. Our empirical results, however, react more sensitively to quantile changes for
volatile market periods. In this context, the choice of the 12.5%-quantile reflects the trade-off between
measuring the tails of the VaR distribution where the largest spillovers occur and an increasing expo-
sure to outliers due to a decreasing number of observations. In Section IV.D we therefore present the
changes on the results from using a 15%- and a 10%-quantile model.
25Similar pictures can be seen for other combinations of financial institutions. The scatter plot in
Figure 1, however, is most suitable for demonstrating the effects of state dependencies. Furthermore,
our empirical results in the next section suggest that shocks from the hedge fund industry are of
particular importance.
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FIGURE 1
VaR Scatter Plots and Quantile Effects for Selected Financial Institutions
Figure 1 shows the slopes of the spillover coefﬁcient β1θ for various quantiles θ. The coefﬁcients show the response of the
value-at-risk (VaR) model in the investment bank industry (denoted on the y-axis) to a shock originating in the hedge fund
industry (denoted on the x-axis). The triangles in the scatter plot denote the lowest 5% of the investment bank’s VaR. For
comparison, the ﬁgure also shows the average and thus state-independent slope coefﬁcient of the CoVaR model (thick
line in the upper graph and horizontal solid line with 95% conﬁdence interval in the lower graph). In contrast, values above
the 75%-quantile are denoted as “upper quantiles”; values between the 12.5%-quantile and the 75%-quantile are denoted
as “middle quantiles”; and values below 12.5% are denoted as “lower quantiles.”
Graph A. CoVaR and SDSVaR Regression Slopes
Graph B. Spillover Coefﬁcient β1θ for Various Quantiles
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109014000325
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:49:18, subject to the Cambridge Core
588 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
black line in Graph B of Figure 1.26 If we interpret this situation as normal market
conditions, it is striking to see that the slope of this coefficient is almost three
times higher during market conditions of financial distress. Similarly, the spillover
effects are close to 0 during tranquil markets.
In order to obtain directional spillover effects, equations (5a)–(5d) are esti-
mated as a system for our four financial institutions (commercial banks, invest-
ment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) and for the three control
variables (real estate investment trusts (REITs), commodities, and nonfinancial
stocks). We obtain a different set of coefficient estimates for each of the three
market states (tranquil, normal, and volatile). Table 2 presents the results for the
spillover coefficients and the autoregressive term from system (5). Shocks are
originating from the financial institutions denoted in the columns of the table and
subsequently spill over to the institution denoted in the rows of the table.27 For
instance, an increase in the VaR of hedge funds by 1% increases the VaR of
investment banks by 0.087% during normal market periods. During a crisis, this
TABLE 2
Coefficients of the Static SDSVaR Models
Table 2 presents the size of the coefﬁcient estimates Bθ of equations (5a)–(5d). Institutions at the top of the table denote
the origin of the shock, while the institutions in table rows denote the responding institution. Coefﬁcients are estimated for
tranquil, normal, and volatile market states. Market states are measured by the 75%-, 50%-, and the 12.5%-quantile of the
value-at-risk distribution of the responding institution, respectively. For instance, a 1-percentage-point increase in the VaR
of hedge funds increases the VaR of investment banks by 0.087 percentage points during normal market times. The same
shock, however, increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by 0.707 percentage points during volatile market
phases. The estimation period is Apr. 2, 2003–Dec. 31, 2010 (2,023 obs.). Standard errors are based on 200 bootstrap
replicates and account for the fact that the regressors themselves are ﬁtted values leading to additional uncertainty in
parameter estimates. ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Spillover Coefﬁcient Bθ Control Variables
from . . . Insurance Commercial Investment Hedge
to . . . Companies Banks Banks Funds REITs Commodity Stocks Lag
Panel A. Tranquil
Insurance companies — 0.006** 0.001 0.047** −0.003** −0.001 −0.004** 0.939**
Commercial banks −0.003 — 0.003* 0.013** 0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.958**
Investment banks 0.012** 0.005** — 0.062** −0.007** −0.002* −0.018** 0.946**
Hedge funds 0.001 0.000 0.001* — 0.000 −0.001 −0.002** 0.869**
Panel B. Normal
Insurance companies — 0.020** 0.004 0.074** −0.008** 0.007* −0.009 0.943**
Commercial banks 0.001 — 0.009** 0.088** −0.007** 0.004 −0.017** 0.979**
Investment banks 0.012** 0.007** — 0.087** −0.007** −0.002 −0.013** 0.957**
Hedge funds 0.003** −0.001** 0.001** — 0.000 −0.002** −0.002 0.915**
Panel C. Volatile
Insurance companies — 0.029** 0.012 0.342** 0.013* 0.046** −0.070** 1.039**
Commercial banks 0.047** — 0.045** 0.278** 0.026** 0.023* −0.111** 0.999**
Investment banks 0.044** 0.051** — 0.707** −0.021** 0.032 −0.098** 0.999**
Hedge funds −0.007** 0.004** 0.007** — −0.001 −0.006** −0.001 1.097**
26This slope estimate is based on a regression of the investment banking sector’s VaR on a con-
stant and the VaR of the other three financial institutions (see system (5)). In contrast, the two-
dimensional scatter plot corresponds to a simple regression with only one regressor and is used to
highlight the importance of state dependency rather than showing the results from our estimation
equation.
27To save space, Table 2 does not show the risk spillovers to the control variables.
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spillover effect is estimated to be 0.707% (i.e., eight times higher). Ignoring state
dependency as in the case of the CoVaR model from equation (3), therefore, leads
to substantial underestimation of spillover effects. Note that the standard errors
in Table 2 are not only determined by the sampling error in the quantile regres-
sion framework but also by the uncertainty within the VaRs themselves, which
depend on the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) coefficients. To obtain correct
standard errors for Table 2, we apply the maximum entropy bootstrap of Vinod
and Lo´pez-de-Lacalle (2009), which addresses the time-series properties within
each financial institution but also retains the dependency characteristics between
our four institutions. This technique is used on the raw data to produce 200 boot-
strapped versions of Table 2 from which the upper and lower quantiles can be
directly determined.
Table 2 shows that shocks to hedge funds also have some effect on the VaR of
insurance companies, and to some extent on commercial banks. Hedge funds and
investment banks show some degree of interdependence. During volatile market
periods, a 1% increase in the VaR of investment banks leads to a 0.007% increase
in the VaR of hedge funds. Every percentage-point increase in the VaR of hedge
funds in turn has feedback effects in the order of 0.707%. We also find that com-
mercial banks increasingly affect insurance companies moving from tranquil to
volatile market periods. These results are in line with Allen and Gale (2007), who
argue that credit risk has been considerably transferred from the banking sector to
insurance companies. In terms of spillover coefficient size, however, we conclude
from Table 2 that hedge funds play a major role in the transmission of shocks to
other financial institutions.
This finding should not be unexpected, as recent work directly or indirectly
points to hedge funds as major contributors of systemic risk. For instance,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that hedge funds are an important source
of market liquidity if funding liquidity is high, but traders are less willing to hold
high margin positions once funding liquidity declines. King and Maier (2009)
stress excessive leverage in combination with herding behavior as an important
source of intra hedge fund spillovers. With high leverage, even moderate price
swings can force hedge funds to liquidate positions in order to meet margin calls.
The high levels of leverage and similarity in investment strategies set off a feed-
back loop where adverse price moves result in liquidations (Danielsson and Shin
(2003)). One interpretation for the findings in Table 2 may be that when major
prime brokers experienced financial distress in 2008–2009, hedge funds were the
first to be affected by margin calls and a tightening of credit availability.28 This
had a significant negative impact on the funding and the asset side of hedge funds
during market downturn. As a consequence, risk spillovers among hedge funds
arose and affected the entire hedge fund industry. Because hedge funds and banks
28To give an example, The Economist (Oct. 23, 2008) reports, “In Europe many funds found
that the assets they pledged as collateral in return for financing from Lehman have become trapped
in the bankruptcy process as administrators strain to work out which assets genuinely belong to
clients. Worse still, many assets have simply disappeared, thanks to a standard industry practice called
‘rehypotecation,’ in which prime brokers use clients’ collateral to raise financing of their own.”
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are interconnected, the failure of hedge funds leads to capital losses among in-
vestment banks (Klaus and Rzepkowski (2009)).
Note that our results do not imply that major shocks during the 2007–2009
financial crisis originated in the hedge funds industry and subsequently spread
to other institutions. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that some hedge fund
distress was caused by increasing margins set by prime brokers. Our findings
indicate, however, that shocks in the hedge fund industry (coming from prime
brokers or any other source) did not stay in the hedge fund industry. Instead,
and this is what seems to be a distinct feature of hedge funds, shocks to hedge
funds were amplified and led to severe spillovers to other financial institutions, in
particular to investment banks.29
Table 2 also presents the coefficients of the autoregressive term, which are
estimated to be close to 1.30 Note that although VaR measures are known to move
wildly during crisis periods, the autoregressive structure is actually stronger dur-
ing this time.31
Comparing the correlations reported in Table 1 to the results based on the
SDSVaR model reported in Table 2, we find two striking differences. First, while
the correlations do tend to increase in the crisis, the increase is much smaller
than the increases in spillover coefficients estimated using SDSVaR. Relying on
correlations may substantially underestimate the externality of one set of financial
institutions on another set during times of financial distress. Second, the SDSVaR
results suggest a much more prominent role for hedge funds as institutions that
tend to generate significant spillover effects for other financial institutions. The
differences are due to the fact that the SDSVaR model eliminates correlations that
arise due to all financial institutions being hit by the same common shock and
isolates the spillover effects. The spillover effects can be interpreted as evidence
in the spirit of endogenous risk as recently proposed by Danielsson and Shin
(2003) and Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009) and represent an amplification
of the initial shock to the system.32
29Much of hedge fund distress was caused by investors’ mass redemptions during the crisis period.
We also estimated a version of Table 2 that includes as an exogenous variable the in- and outflows
of funds to the aggregate hedge fund industry. This variable was only available in monthly frequency,
so that our results are hardly definitive. Based on these estimates, however, the flows variable was
economically and statistically insignificant. The results are available from the authors.
30In the presence of serially correlated disturbances, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
leads to biased coefficient estimates. Inspection of the regression residuals showed little or no auto-
correlation, with values generally below 0.15.
31Some coefficients are estimated to be slightly above 1. This might raise some concerns about the
stationarity properties of the VaR series. An economic interpretation would be that if, over a period of
time, each day is dominated by negative returns, the VaRs of financial institutions respond by turning
more negative each day. What is typically observed, however, are return series showing alternating
patterns of negative and positive changes so that negative shocks with lag coefficients above 1 are
followed by positive shocks with coefficients below 1. Thus, after a shock, the VaR quickly returns
to more stable environments rather than increasing indefinitely. Finally, the VaR is directly tied to the
return series, which in turn is stationary.
32We also tested the spillover effects of different hedge fund strategies (see the Internet Appendix
for details). Our results suggest that the importance of hedge funds in generating spillover effects
to other financial institutions is not necessarily due to the convergence of hedge fund styles during
volatile times.
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C. Time-Varying Coefficient Estimates and One-Step-Ahead Forecasts
In this section, we estimate the SDSVaR as a series of one-step-ahead fore-
casts using a rolling window of 500 trading days. This requires estimating the
SDSVaR for different quantiles and selecting the quantile model that best repre-
sents the economic conditions at time t. For instance, the SDSVaR model with
coefficient estimates that correspond to the lower tail of the left-hand side VaR
distribution is applied during times of financial distress. In this situation, a fore-
cast incorporates the “coefficients of the crisis” rather than some average measure,
which may not be representative of the dependence structure during this time.33
We obtain the SDSVaR as the fitted values from equations (5a)–(5d). For
instance, the SDSVaR of institution i, ̂SDSVaRi|j,k,l can be expressed as
̂SDSVaR{i| j,k,l},t,θ = αˆθ + ˆβ1,θ̂VaRj,t + ˆβ2,θ̂VaRk,t(6)
+ ˆβ3,θ̂VaRl,t + ˆβ4,θ̂VaRi,t−1.
Graph A of Figure 2 shows the SDSVaR for investment banks with spillovers
from insurance companies, commercial banks, and the hedge fund industry for the
period Feb. 28, 2005–Dec. 31, 2010 (1,525 observations).34 For comparison, the
graph also shows the performance of the CoVaR model. While the CoVaR and
the SDSVaR are very similar during calm market periods, the CoVaR is less sen-
sitive to extreme risk during downward markets. In contrast to other common VaR
methods, such as the normal VaR, however, both VaR models react to changes in
the underlying return process and indicate a high level of risk during the crisis pe-
riod of 2008 and the first half of 2009.35 In this respect, the SDSVaR is also quite
similar to established flexible VaR measures, such as the GARCH-type VaR or the
CAViaR model of Engle and Manganelli (2004). In fact, recent studies show that
these univariate VaR models are already very efficient, so that room for improve-
ments is marginal at best (Kuester et al. (2006)). The contribution of the SDSVaR
model to the body of existing VaR techniques is that i) it explicitly reveals the
magnitude of the spillover at time t, and ii) it provides useful information for sce-
nario analysis in asking questions such as “How will a shock to the hedge fund
industry affect a certain asset class or a group of financial institutions?”36
Graph B of Figure 2 shows the changes in spillover coefficientsBθ and their
corresponding 95% error bands for a rolling 500-trading-day window. From left
to right, this graph shows the risk spillovers from insurance companies, commer-
cial banks, and hedge funds on the VaR of investment banks. In line with our
previous findings, investment banks are only marginally affected by insurance
33The short memory in the autoregressive structure of the SDSVaR model lends itself to
one-step-ahead forecasts, whereas multi-step-ahead forecasts will quickly lose efficiency. The fore-
cast performance will also depend on the stability of the current economic condition.
34Note that a foregoing training sample is required to obtain the necessary information for estimat-
ing the first entry in the series of spillover coefficients. The estimation period therefore does not start
in Apr. 2, 2003 as before, but 500 days later.
35See, for instance, Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) for a comparison of GARCH-type VaR and
normal VaR.
36We will answer these kinds of questions in Section IV.D when we model the dynamic effects of
a one-time shock using IRFs.
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FIGURE 2
Dynamic SDSVaR Model for Investment Banks
Figure 2 shows the behavior and performance of the dynamic SDSVaR model for the period Mar. 1, 2005–Dec. 31, 2010
(1,524 obs.). Graph A shows the series of rolling window one-step-ahead forecasts of the SDSVaR that measures the
spillover effects from insurance companies, commercial banks, and hedge funds to investment banks. Graph B displays
the dynamic behavior of the spillover coefﬁcients over time for different states of the economy together with 95% conﬁdence
bands indicating the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimates. The 75%-, 50%-, and 12.5%-quantile correspond to tranquil,
normal, and volatile market periods, respectively. Because of the backward-looking behavior of the 500-day rolling window,
the coefﬁcients reﬂect the distress period in 2008 with a lag.
Graph A. Out-of-Sample Dynamic SDSVaR
Graph B. Time-Varying Coefﬁcients and Error Bands
companies and commercial banks but react strongly to changes in the VaR of
hedge funds. For these institutions, risk spillovers remain close to 0 during tran-
quil market periods and are generally below 0.7 for normal market phases. Dur-
ing crisis periods, however, the magnitude of risk spillovers increases markedly,
with coefficients for the lower 12.5%-quantile often being more than twice the
size of the spillovers during normal market phases. The 2-standard-deviation error
bands show that the effects are also significant during most of the sample period.
Note that the backward-looking 500-day rolling window causes the coefficients
to react with a lag. For instance, coefficient estimates that are based on a sample
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window with its 500th observation in the first half of 2008 reflect the time before
investment banks were in distress. However, coefficients start to respond to the
new circumstances as the crisis period becomes a significant part of the rolling
window. Thus, the sharp rise in hedge fund spillovers during 2009 in fact reflects
occurrences from the second half of 2008, when the investment banks were first
hit by the financial crisis.
D. Feedback Effects and Persistence of Risk Spillovers
The risk spillover estimates from the preceding section marked the responses
of financial institutions within the same day. If institutions are in fact interdepen-
dent and shocks are persistent, it would seem reasonable i) to expect reactions to
the initial shock to last over a longer period of time and ii) to observe feedback
effects among these institutions. In this section, we address this issue by employ-
ing IRFs that show the dynamic behavior of a system of SDSVaRs in the presence
of a one-time shock to one financial institution.
The IRFs are computed similarly to classical vector autoregressions estimated
from OLS. The only difference is that we do not have one coefficient matrix but
three (one for each quantile) and hence three different responses. The IRFs are
orthogonalized using the standard Cholesky decomposition. Since we have no the-
oretic guidance for a possible ordering of our variables, we choose the most con-
servative approach of ordering the shock-transmitting variable last. This means
that we restrict the responses such that the shocked variable only affects itself at
time t but generates no contemporaneous spillovers (the first spillovers start at
time t + 1). While this approach means that our IRFs are potentially downward
biased, they can be regarded as the smallest estimated response given a shock to
one financial institution. More importantly, we mitigate the problem of an ad hoc
ordering by treating all variables equally.
Figure 3 shows the IRFs for tranquil, normal, and volatile market condi-
tions. This corresponds to θ being equal to the 75%-, the 50%-, and the 12.5%-
quantiles of institution i’s VaR distribution over the period Apr. 2, 2003–Dec. 31,
2010 (2,023 observations), respectively. We shock each financial institution in
turn (the order from left to right being insurance companies, commercial banks,
investment banks, and hedge funds) and observe the response from the other three
institutions. The size of the immediate response depends on the size of the spillover
estimates in Table 2, B′θ =
(
ˆβ1,θ, ˆβ2,θ, . . . , ˆβ16,θ
)
, whereas the persistence of the
response depends on both, the spillover size Bθ as well as the size of the own lag
(e.g., ˆβ4,θ in equation (5a)). The VaRs of the financial institutions therefore show
larger responses for low quantile states during which the distress coefficients are
used to compute the response.
Each series is shocked once in the order of 1 standard deviation. During calm
market periods, none of the shocks to the VaR measures of any of the four finan-
cial institutions leads to significant spillovers to the VaRs of other institutions.
This supports our hypothesis that risk spillovers only take place under distressed
market conditions but do not pose a threat to the whole system when financial
markets are in a stable condition.
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FIGURE 3
IRFs for Tranquil, Normal, and Volatile Market Conditions
Figure 3 shows how ﬁnancial institutions respond to shocks originating from other institutions. The size of the shock of each
series is 1 standard deviation. In addition to the size of the response, the IRFs also show how quickly institutions respond, as
well as how persistent the response is. The estimates are obtained from a seven-equation system (four ﬁnancial institutions
and three control variables) using two-stage quantile regression. The Cholesky ordering is such that the shocked series
comes last. This way, the IRFs show the most conservative spillover dynamics: The shocked series is assumed to have no
spillover effects on the other three institutions in period t (i.e., spillovers start with a lag of 1 day). Ordering the series this
way means our spillover estimates are likely to be downward biased. On the other hand, we avoid the problem of an ad
hoc ordering by treating all series equally. The observation period ranges from Apr. 2, 2003–Dec. 31, 2010 (2,023 obs.).
During volatile market conditions, the crisis coefﬁcients are used only at the time of the shock in t0. In the following days,
the model returns to the normal market times’ coefﬁcients. Graph C shows the 0.125-quantile response together with the
0.15-quantile response (upper border of the bands) and the 0.1-quantile response (lower border of the bands).
Graph A. Tranquil Market Conditions: 0.75-Quantile Response
Graph B. Normal Market Conditions: 0.5-Quantile Response
Graph C. Volatile Market Conditions: 0.125-Quantile Response
As we proceed toward more volatile market conditions, we can to some
extent observe risk spillovers from commercial banks to insurance companies.
The most striking effects, however, come from shocks to the hedge fund indus-
try. They increase the absolute value of VaR for all other institutions, even under
market conditions in which shocks in other industries remain unnoticed. During
times of extreme volatility, however, shocks from hedge funds have substantial ef-
fects on all of the remaining three institutions. The largest impact can be observed
for the VaR of the investment bank sector, for which the response is estimated to
be around three-quarters the size of the initial shock to the hedge fund industry.
In fact, for very low quantiles, the crisis coefficients do not lead back to a steady
state, so that the responses are explosive. This simply reflects the fact that if, over a
period of time, each day were dominated by extreme negative shocks, the VaRs of
financial institutions would respond by turning more negative each day. We there-
fore return to the normal market state coefficients after the day of the shock.
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We believe this setting to be reasonable. Even during a financial crisis, extreme
negative shocks only occur over a few days but generally lead to volatility clus-
tering also containing positive returns. This also has implications for commercial
banks’ shock response over time. During normal market times, commercial banks
have the largest lag coefficient (0.979). In addition, in normal times risk spillovers
from hedge funds are estimated to be the largest for commercial banks. As a con-
sequence, shocks in the banking sector are more persistent, with only about 50%
of the initial shock being adjusted after three months. Note also that part of the re-
sponse of insurance companies is likely to be due to their exposure to both hedge
funds and commercial banks.
Finally, the four graphs at the bottom of Figure 3 also show the effects of a
15%- and a 10%-quantile model, represented as upper and lower borders of the
shaded bands around the 12.5%-quantile estimates. The width of those bands sug-
gests that the choice of a specific quantile may have some effect on the estimates
for commercial banks but has very little effect on the results from the other three
institutions.
Our estimates concerning the duration of spillover effects also help to resolve
an apparent conflict with other recent findings. For instance, Billio et al. (2012)
find the returns of commercial banks and insurers to have a more significant im-
pact on the returns of hedge funds and investment banks than vice versa. How-
ever, the authors estimate return spillover effects that occur between months. The
majority of the risk spillover effects in our model, however, are effective within
1 month. These intramonth effects remain unobservable to empirical studies based
on a monthly frequency.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk
(SDSVaR) model that measures spillover effects in a system of simultaneous
equations conditional on the state of the economy. We estimate a system of quan-
tile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks,
investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) using daily data. Con-
ditioning on the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile), we find
the size and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions to change sub-
stantially depending on the state of the market. While risk spillovers are small
during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects dur-
ing crisis times. For instance, during normal market times, a 1-percentage-point
increase in the VaR of hedge funds is estimated to increase the VaR of investment
banks by 0.09 percentage points. The same shock, however, increases the VaR of
the investment bank industry by 0.71 percentage points during times of financial
distress.
Our empirical results further show that, again during market distress, a 1%
increase in the VaR of the hedge fund industry leads to a 0.34% increase in the
VaR of insurance companies and a 0.28% increase in the VaR of commercial
banks. Using a set of IRFs, we trace the responses of the same shocks over time
and find that they reach their peak after 10–15 days.
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The SDSVaR approach developed in this paper permits a delineation of com-
mon shocks affecting all institutions simultaneously from “pure” spillover effects
in a quantile regression setting. Comparing the results to simple time-varying
correlations, we show that correlations may overstate spillovers in normal times
and understate spillovers in volatile times. In addition, we find that hedge funds
may play an even more prominent role as transmission channels and amplifiers of
systemic risk than previously thought.
Although the SDSVaR model is useful for measuring and quantifying
spillover effects, it does not explain the mechanisms underlying the estimated
spillovers. In order to trace spillover effects back to economic relationships, rather
than statistical ones, one would need much more detailed information on the expo-
sures among different financial institutions, their asset holdings, and their liability
structure. In particular, for hedge funds, most of this information is currently un-
available. Hence, the findings support initiatives as in Lo (2008), who in his testi-
mony for the U.S. House of Representatives emphasizes that hedge funds should
be required to provide more information on a confidential basis to regulators,
for example, leverage, liquidity, counterparties, and holdings, in order to enable
supervisors to more accurately assess the risks in the financial sector.
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